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Trial Practice and Procedure
by John O'Shea Sullivan*
and Ashby L. Kent*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The 2007 survey period yielded several noteworthy decisions by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit relating to
federal trial practice and procedure, many of which concerned issues of
first impression. This Article analyzes recent developments in the
Eleventh Circuit, including significant rulings in the areas of class
actions, civil procedure, subject matter jurisdiction, statutory interpretation, and other issues of interest to trial practitioners.
II.

CLASS ACTIONS

A. Whether, and Under What Circumstances,a Class Action Waiver
Contained in an ArbitrationProvision May Be Deemed Unconscionable
and Unenforceable as a Matter of Law
In Dale v. Comcast Corp.,' the Eleventh Circuit held that "the
enforceability of a particular class action waiver in an arbitration
agreement must be determined on a case-by-case basis, considering the
totality of the facts and circumstances."2 In so holding, the Eleventh
Circuit distinguished this case from its prior precedent, in which the

* Partner in the firm of Burr & Forman, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. University of Georgia
(A.B.J., 1991); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1995).
Member, Mercer Law Review (1993-1994); Managing Editor, (1994-1995). Member, State
Bars of Georgia and North Carolina.
** Associate in the firm of Burr & Forman, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Vanderbilt
University (B.A., magna cum laude, 2000 (Phi Beta Kappa)); Emory University School of
Law (J.D., with honors, 2003). Notes and Comments Editor, Emory International Law
Review (2002-2003). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. 498 F.3d 1216 (11th Cir. 2007).
2. Id. at 1224.
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court held that arbitration agreements precluding class action relief were
valid and enforceable.'
The plaintiffs were Georgia residents and subscribers of the defendant,
Comcast Corporation ("Comcast"), a cable television provider. The
plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit against Comcast, alleging violations
of state law based on the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 (the
"Cable Act"). 4
The subscribers alleged that Comcast improperly
calculated certain "pass-through franchise fees" and thus charged its
customers more than it actually paid in franchise fees based on actual
revenues.5 Comcast removed the action to the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia and filed a motion to compel
arbitration and dismiss, arguing that the subscribers' individual claims
were governed by written arbitration agreements contained in annual
notices that the subscribers received.' The arbitration agreements
contained a class action waiver clause prohibiting subscribers from
bringing claims on a class action or consolidated basis.' Comcast
argued that the subscribers accepted the arbitration agreements,
including the class action waivers, by their continued subscription to
Comcast's services after receiving the notices. The subscribers disputed
having received the notices or having agreed to the arbitration provi-

3. Id. at 1221 ("[I]in at least two other cases, [the court] found arbitration agreements
precluding class action relief to be valid and enforceable." (citing Jenkins v. First Am. Cash
Advance of Ga., LLC, 400 F.3d 868, 877-78 (11th Cir. 2005); Randolph v. Green Tree Fin.
Corp.-Ala., 244 F.3d 814, 819 (11th Cir. 2001))).
4. Id. at 1217; 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-542 (2000). The Cable Act authorized local
governments to charge cable operators a franchise fee for the use of public rights of way,
provided the fee does not exceed five percent of the cable operators' gross revenue. 47
U.S.C. §§ 542(a)-(b) (2000). The Cable Act permits cable operators, in turn, to pass the
franchise fees through to their subscribers. Id.
5. Dale, 498 F.3d at 1217-18 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 47 U.S.C.
§ 542). The class asserted claims of unjust enrichment and money had and received and
sought an accounting of funds wrongfully withheld, repayment of excess franchise, and
declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. at 1218.
6. Id. at 1218. "Comcast argued that each subscriber received its 2004 'Policies and
Procedures,' an annual notice containing a mandatory arbitration provision, with his or her
December invoice or in a welcome kit given to each new subscriber at the time of service
installation." Id.
7. Id. The arbitration agreement at issue, entitled "Mandatory & Binding Arbitration,"
included a class action waiver provision that stated as follows:
All parties to the arbitration must be individually named. There shall be no right
or authority for any claims to be arbitrated or litigated on a class-action or
consolidated basis or on basis [sic] involving claims brought in a purported
representative capacity on behalf of the general public (such as a private attorney
general), other subscribers, or other persons similarly situated.
Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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sions and requested a jury trial on the issue of whether they each had
entered into an arbitration agreement with Comcast. The subscribers
also argued that even if the arbitration provision constituted an
agreement to arbitrate, the class action waiver was unconscionable and,
therefore, unenforceable. 8
On September 19, 2006, the district court granted Comcast's motion
to compel arbitration and denied the subscribers' request for a jury trial.
The district court found that the arbitration provision was binding and
that the class action waiver was not unconscionable. The subscribers
appealed, arguing that the district court erred in failing to find the class
action waiver unconscionable. The Eleventh Circuit had to determine
whether the arbitration provision's class action waiver was unconscionable, and thus unenforceable, as a matter of Georgia law If the court
determined that the class action waiver was unenforceable, then the
entire arbitration agreement would be unenforceable pursuant to the
arbitration provision's severability clause, thereby allowing the
subscribers to maintain their action in federal court."°
The subscribers argued that Comcast's class action waiver was
unenforceable because it was substantively unconscionable under
Georgia law." The subscribers cited opinions from the United States

8. Id.
9. Id. at 1218-19. The court noted that the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16
(2000), "'allows state law to invalidate an arbitration agreement, provided the law at issue
governs contracts generally and not arbitration agreements specifically.'" Dale, 498 F.3d
at 1219 (quoting Bess v. Check Express, 294 F.3d 1298, 1306 (11th Cir. 2002)). The court
also determined that it had jurisdiction to decide this issue because the subscribers'
unconscionability argument placed the enforceability of the arbitration provision itself into
issue. Id. at 1219 n.2 (citing Bess, 294 F.3d at 1306).
10. Dale, 498 F.3d at 1219. The severability clause in the arbitration agreement stated:
"In [sic] the class action waiver clause is found to be illegal or unenforceable, the entire
Arbitration Provision will be unenforceable." Id. at 1219 n.3 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
11. Id. at 1219. The court noted that Georgia law recognizes both procedural
unconscionability, which addresses the process of making a contract, as well as substantive
unconscionability, which looks to the contractual terms themselves. Id. (citing NEC Techs.,
Inc. v. Nelson, 267 Ga. 390, 391, 478 S.E.2d 769, 771 (1996)). The court also noted that
under Georgia law,
"[t]he basic test for determining unconscionability is whether, in the light of the
general commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade
or case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the
circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contract."
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting NEC Techs., Inc., 267 Ga. at 391, 478
S.E.2d at 771). The court further observed that "[t]o determine substantive unconscionability, courts focus on 'matters such as the commercial reasonableness of the contract terms,
the purpose and effect of the terms, the allocation of the risks between the parties, and
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Supreme Court12 and the Eleventh Circuit13 recognizing that public
14
policy supports the need for class actions for certain types of claims.
The subscribers argued that if Comcast's class action waiver was held to
be valid, they would effectively be denied any remedy because, even if
successful on their claims, the subscribers individually stood to recover
only a very small amount." The subscribers also pointed out that even
though the arbitration provision required Comcast, upon written request,
to advance arbitration filing fees and arbitrator costs and expenses, it
nonetheless held the subscribers responsible for additional costs,
including attorney fees and expert witness fees. Moreover, if Comcast
prevailed, the arbitration provision required the subscribers to reimburse
Comcast for advanced fees up to the amount the subscribers would have
paid to file the claim in state court. Given the cost of arbitration as
compared to the potential recovery, the subscribers argued that a single
plaintiff would not proceed to arbitration, and that the class action
waiver was unconscionable, because it would "allow Comcast to continue
unabated its alleged practice of overcharging customers. "16
Comcast argued that the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Caley v.
Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. 17 disposed of the subscribers' substantive
unconscionability argument.' 8 In Caley the Eleventh Circuit considered
whether a dispute resolution policy ("DRP"), which required employees
to submit certain employment related claims to arbitration, was
unconscionable under Georgia law.'9 The plaintiffs in Caley claimed
the DRP was substantively unconscionable because, among other things,

similar public policy concerns.'" Id. (quoting NEC Techs., Inc., 267 Ga. at 392, 478 S.E.2d
at 772).
12. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (recognizing that the
policy permitting class actions is to create incentive for plaintiffs to bring actions because
solo actions would result in small recoveries).
13. In re Charter Co., 876 F.2d 866, 871 (11th Cir. 1989) (recognizing that the cost of
pursuing a solo action is a disincentive for plaintiffs to prosecute without the class action
mechanism).
14. Dale, 498 F.3d at 1219-20.
15. Id. at 1220. The subscribers contended that during January, February, and March
of 2005, Comcast charged $629,000 in franchise fees to its Fulton County, Georgia
subscribers, but paid only $590,000 to the local government. This action resulted in a total
overcharge of $39,000, or $0.66 per subscriber ($39,000 divided by an estimated 58,900
Fulton County subscribers) over the three-month period. Thus, over the applicable fouryear statute of limitations, the subscribers estimated that Comcast charged each of them
$10.56 in excess fees ($0.66 every three months for four years). Id.
16. Id.
17. 428 F.3d 1359 (11th Cir. 2005).
18. Dale, 498 F.3d at 1220.
19. 428 F.3d at 1377-79.
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it prohibited class actions.2 ° In Dale the Eleventh Circuit disagreed
with Comcast and held that its prior decision in Caley did not require it
to conclude that the class action waiver at issue in the instant case was
enforceable. 21 Rather, as the court in Dale observed, the court in Caley
determined only that under the specific facts of that case, the DRP
prohibiting class actions was enforceable-it did not conclude that every
class action waiver was or would be enforceable under Georgia law.22
The Eleventh Circuit also distinguished its holding in Caley on the
grounds that Caley did not involve a factual scenario "in which a remedy
was effectively foreclosed because of the negligible amount of recovery
when compared to the cost of bringing an arbitration action."2 3 The
court further noted that each of the claims in Caley provided for the
recovery of attorney fees, expert costs, or both in the event that the
plaintiff prevailed.2 4
Although the court recognized that it had found arbitration agreements precluding class action relief to be valid and enforceable in at
least two other cases, both of those actions were claims for which
attorney fees and other costs were recoverable.2
The Eleventh Circuit

20. Id. at 1373. The court in Dale quoted from its brief discussion of this argument in
Caley, as follows:
"As the Supreme Court has explained, the fact that certain litigation devices may
not be available in an arbitration is part and parcel of arbitration's ability to offer
simplicity, informality, and expedition, characteristics that generally make
arbitration an attractive vehicle for the resolution of low-value claims. The DRP's
prohibition of class actions and discovery limitations are consistent with the goals
of simplicity, informality and expedition touted by the Supreme Court."
Dale, 498 F.3d at 1220-21 (quoting Caley, 428 F.3d at 1378).
21. Id. at 1221.
22. Id. (citing Caley, 428 F.3d at 1379).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. (citing Jenkins, 400 F.3d at 877-78; Randolph, 244 F.3d at 819). Both Jenkins
and Randolph involved claims that permitted recovery of attorney fees and other costs.
For example, in Jenkins the plaintiff filed a class action lawsuit, alleging that certain
"payday" loan agreements violated Georgia's usury statutes and section 16-4-4 of the
Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), O.C.G.A. § 16-4-4
(2007). Jenkins, 400 F.3d at 872-73. Each time the plaintiff obtained a payday loan, she
signed an arbitration agreement in which she agreed to arbitrate claims, or assert them
in a small claims tribunal, and to waive class action relief. Id. at 870. The district court
determined that the arbitration agreements were substantively unconscionable because
they precluded borrowers from either "'instigating or participating'" in class action suits.
Id. at 877 (quoting Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance of Ga., LLC, 313 F. Supp. 2d 1370,
1375 (S.D. Ga. 2003)). As the court in Dale noted, the court in Jenkins determined that
"'[a] class action is the only way that borrowers with claims as small as the individual loan
transactions [at issue in this case] can obtain relief,' and speculated that a borrower who
attempts to pursue a single claim would 'probably' be unable to find affordable representa-
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held that unlike the plaintiffs in those cases, the subscribers in Dale
could not recover attorney fees under the Cable Act for the specific
violations alleged.26 Although the subscribers had asserted state law
claims under which they may have been able to recover attorney fees
and costs,2

7

the Eleventh Circuit held that the potential recovery of

attorney fees and litigation costs under Georgia law did "not provide the
same incentive for an attorney to represent an individual plaintiff as the
automatic, or likely, award of fees and costs available to a prevailing
plaintiff for the claims asserted" in the other cases in which the court
had enforced class action waiver provisions.28 The court thus found
itself "in unchartered territory" and looked to sister circuit decisions
addressing the enforceability of class action waivers for guidance.29
The court found the First Circuit's opinion in Kristian v. Comcast
Corp., ° which addressed the enforceability of arbitration agreements
tion." Dale, 498 F.3d at 1222 (brackets in original) (quoting Jenkins, 400 F.3d at 877).
In Randolph the Eleventh Circuit addressed whether an arbitration agreement that bars
pursuit of class-wide relief for violations of the federal Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), 15
U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f (2000), was unenforceable for that reason. Randolph, 244 F.3d at
816. The opinion did not discuss whether the class action waiver was unconscionable, but
whether it was inconsistent with the statutory text and legislative history of TILA. Id. at
816-19. The court specifically noted that "the public policy goals of TIIA can be vindicated
through arbitration, and the statute contains other incentives-statutory damages and
attorneys fees-for bringing TILA claims." Id. at 818.
In Jenkins the Eleventh Circuit determined that the class action waiver was not
unconscionable, noting that it had previously held in Randolph that "'a contractual
provision to arbitrate TILA claims is enforceable even if it precludes a plaintiff from
utilizing class action procedures in vindicating statutory rights under TILA.'" Jenkins,400
F.3d at 877-78 (quoting Randolph, 244 F.3d at 819). In Jenkins the Eleventh Circuit also
determined that the district court's contention that customers would likely be unable to
obtain legal representation without the class action vehicle was unfounded because under
Georgia's RICO Act, the plaintiff could recover attorney fees and costs if she prevailed. Id.
at 878. The Eleventh Circuit stated that "when the opportunity to recover attorneys' fees
is available, lawyers will be willing to represent ... debtors in arbitration," and therefore
concluded that "precluding class action relief [would] not have the practical effect of
immunizing [the defendants, and] inclusion of a class action waiver in the Arbitration
Agreements did not render those Agreements substantively unconscionable." Id.
26. Dale, 498 F.3d at 1222.
27. Georgia law provides that a jury may award litigation expenses and attorney fees
"where the plaintiff has specially pleaded and has made prayer therefor and where the
defendant has acted in bad faith in making the contract, has been stubbornly litigious, or
has caused the plaintiff unnecessary trouble and expense." O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 (1982 &
Supp. 2007).
28. Dale, 498 F.3d at 1222-23. The court noted that under Georgia law, "'[tihe
expenses of litigation generally shall not be allowed as part of the damages."' Id. (brackets
in original) (quoting O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11).
29. Id. at 1223.
30. 446 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2006).
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invoked by Comcast against a group of Boston subscribers suing
Comcast for violations of state and federal antitrust law, to be instructive.31 In Kristian the subscribers argued that the arbitration agreements prevented them from vindicating their statutory rights by
prohibiting the use of the class mechanism.3 2 The First Circuit noted
that "the legitimacy of the arbitral forum rests on 'the presumption that
arbitration provides a fair and adequate mechanism for enforcing
statutory rights.' 33 The First Circuit further noted that the bar on
class arbitration threatened this presumption given the "complexity of
an antitrust case generally, and the complexity and cost required to
prosecute a case against Comcast specifically."34 The First Circuit
struck down the class action waiver, determining that without some
form of class mechanism, a consumer antitrust plaintiff would not sue
at all and that "Comcast [would] be essentially shielded from private
consumer antitrust enforcement liability, even in cases where it ha[d]
35
violated the law."
Although the subscribers in Dale did not argue that the class action
waiver prevented them from vindicating their statutory rights, the
Eleventh Circuit nonetheless determined that without the benefit of a
class action mechanism, the subscribers would effectively be precluded
from suing Comcast for the specific violations of the Cable Act.36 The
court stated that it would be difficult for a single subscriber to obtain
representation because: (1) the cost of vindicating an individual
subscriber's claim, when compared to his or her potential recovery, was
too great; (2) the Cable Act did not provide for the recovery of attorney
fees or related costs for the violations alleged by the subscribers; and (3)
Georgia law allowed fees and costs only to be awarded where bad faith
was shown.3 ' This would allow Comcast to engage in potentially illegal
unchecked market behavior, and the court determined that corporations
should not be permitted to use class action waivers as a means to free

31. Dale, 498 F.3d at 1223 (citing Kristian, 446 F.3d at 29).
32. 446 F.3d at 37.
33. Id. at 54 (quoting Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierece, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170
F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 1999)).
34. Id. at 58.
35. Id. at 61. But see Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d
159, 174-75 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding a class action waiver enforceable despite its potential
to immunize defendants from low-value claims, but emphasizing that the relevant state
law's prohibition of class actions was a "highly relevant factor in considering the equities
of the arbitration clauses").
36. 498 F.3d at 1224.
37. Id.
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themselves from liability for small value claims."8 In sum, the court
held "that the enforceability of a particular class action waiver in an
arbitration agreement must be determined on a case-by-case basis,
considering the totality of the facts and circumstances."" The court
further held that relevant circumstances may include, without limitation,
the fairness of the provisions, the cost to an individual plaintiff of
vindicating the claim when compared to the plaintiff's potential
recovery, the ability to recover attorneys' fees and other costs and thus
obtain legal representation to prosecute the underlying claim, the
practical affect [sic] the waiver will have on a company's ability to
engage in40 unchecked market behavior, and related public policy
concerns.

B. Identifying the Requirements for Federal Subject Matter
Jurisdiction Under the "MassAction" Provision of the Class Action
FairnessAct of 2005 ("CAFA") and Determining Which Party Bears
the Burden of Proving Jurisdictionin a Removed Case Involving
Unspecified Damages Under CAFA
In Lowery v. Alabama Power Co.,41 the Eleventh Circuit examined
several issues concerning the interpretation of CAFA,42 and each issue
was a matter of first impression.4 3 First, the court held that any
defendant authorized to remove an action to federal court under CAFA
may remove the action as a whole, regardless of whether other
defendants were authorized to remove their claims.4 4 Next, the court
identified the four threshold requirements for establishing federal
subject matter jurisdiction under CAFA's "mass action" provision.45

38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that
the Comcast class action waiver was unconscionable to the extent that it prohibited the
subscribers from bringing a class action suit alleging state law claims based on the
violation of the Cable Act's franchise fee provisions, 47 U.S.C. § 542. Dale, 498 F.3d at
1224. Further, because the class action waiver could not be severed from the arbitration
agreement, the entire arbitration provision was rendered unenforceable. Id.
41. 483 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 2007).
42. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
43. 483 F.3d at 1187.
44. Id. at 1196.
45. Id. at 1202-03. "Where the parties are minimally diverse, the action consists of 100
plaintiffs or more, the plaintiffs' claims share common questions of law or fact, and the
potential aggregate value of all the claims exceeds $5,000,000, the action may be removed
to federal court as a mass action." Id. at 1221.
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Finally, the court reaffirmed that the removing defendant, under CAFA,
bears the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction by a
preponderance of the evidence.4 6 It further held that a defendant is not
entitled to conduct jurisdictional discovery to meet this burden, and the
district court should not allow or conduct such discovery on its own
initiative.47
The plaintiffs were Alabama residents who filed suit against several
corporate defendants in an Alabama state court, alleging various state
law tort claims and demanding damages of $1.25 million each.4 8 The
plaintiffs amended their complaint three times over three years, adding
more than 400 plaintiffs and amending their prayers for relief to request
damages "in excess of the [court's] minimum jurisdictional limit."49 The

final amended complaint added new defendants, including Alabama
Power Company."0 The plaintiffs could have brought the suit as a class
action but did not do so."'
Alabama Power filed a notice of removal in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Alabama under CAFA's mass action
provision. 52 Alabama Power contended that the district court had
diversity of citizenship subject matter jurisdiction because5 3 the
complaint contained claims of more than 100 persons, each claim was for
an amount exceeding $75,000, the claims totaled more than $5
million,64 and the claims involved common questions of law or fact. 5

46. Id. at 1208, 1211.
47. Id. at 1216-18.
48. Id. at 1187-88. The plaintiffs alleged that the twelve defendant corporations, along
with 120 fictitious entities, discharged particulates and gases into the atmosphere and
ground water that caused the plaintiffs to suffer personal injuries. Id.
49. Id. at 1188 (brackets in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
50. The third and final amended complaint was filed on June 20, 2006. Id.
51. Id. at 1188 n.4 (citing ALA. R. Civ. P. 23).
52. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11) (2000 & Supp. V 2005)).
53. Id. at 1188.
Prior to CAFA, the Supreme Court had interpreted the "diversity" requirement of
§ 1332(a) to require that each named member of the plaintiff class be diverse from
each of the defendants. The new § 1332(d) replaces [the] modified "complete
diversity" requirement with a "minimal diversity" requirement under which, for
purposes of establishing jurisdiction, only one member of the plaintiff
class-named or unnamed-must be diverse from any one defendant.
Id. at 1194 n. 24 (citations omitted).
54. Id. at 1188.
Before CAFA, the claims of a class of plaintiffs were not permitted to be
aggregated for purposes of satisfying the jurisdictional amount requirement of
§ 1332(a) and, therefore, federal courts did not have jurisdiction over the claims
of any individual plaintiffs that failed to satisfy the jurisdictional amount. CAFA
replaces this "non-aggregation" principle with an amount in controversy
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The plaintiffs filed a motion to remand, asserting that Alabama Power
had not met its burden of establishing federal jurisdiction because
nothing in the notice of removal or the complaint indicated the specific
amount of damages sought. Alabama Power supplemented its notice of
removal and requested leave to conduct limited jurisdictional discovery
if the court determined the amended notice of removal did not establish
the $5 million minimum." The plaintiffs subsequently withdrew their
motion to remand and conceded jurisdiction, but the district court
nonetheless ordered the plaintiffs to file the names of all the plaintiffs
whose claims could reasonably be expected to exceed $75,000.57
The plaintiffs immediately responded to the district court's order,
claiming they lacked sufficient information to determine whether each
claim was worth $75,000, and moved the court to either set aside its
order or accept their response as adequate. The plaintiffs then renewed
their motion to remand, contending that Alabama Power had not met its
burden of showing each plaintiff's claims exceeded $75,000.5
The
district court granted the plaintiffs' motion and remanded the case to
state court, stating that CAFA had not changed the rule that "'when a
state court complaint is uncertain or silent on the amount being sought,
the removing defendant under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 has the burden of
proving the jurisdictional amount by a preponderance of the evidence."'5 9 The district court found that the defendants failed to prove
that CAFA's jurisdictional amount was satisfied because they had shown
neither that one plaintiff had claims in excess of $75,000 nor that all of
the plaintiffs' claims combined exceeded $5 million.60

requirement that explicitly permits aggregation of claims.
Id. at 1194 n.24 (citations omitted) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6)).
55. Id. at 1188. "CAFA gives the district courts subject matter jurisdiction to entertain
a 'mass action' removed from state court provided that the action has been brought by 100
or more plaintiffs whose combined claims total in excess of $5,000,000." Id. at 1188 n.7.
56. Id. at 1188-89. In their supplement to the notice of removal, the defendants argued
that subject matter jurisdiction existed because (1) the case involved claims of more than
100 persons, (2) each plaintiffs claim would need to yield only $12,500 to reach the
required minimum of $5 million, and (3) the plaintiffs in recent Alabama mass tort actions
had received jury verdicts or settlements for more than $5 million. Id. at 1189.
57. Id. at 1190.
58. Id. at 1191.
59. Id. at 1191-92 (quoting Lowery v. Honeywell Intl, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1296
(N.D. Ala. 2006)).
60. Id. at 1192. The district court also held, as a threshold matter, that it lacked
jurisdiction over the claims against the defendants who had been made parties to the
action prior to CAFA's February 18, 2005 effective date. Id.
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On appeal,"' the Eleventh Circuit first addressed whether the preCAFA defendants could properly join in Alabama Power's removal.62
The court looked at CAFA's plain language and concluded that removal
under CAFA encompasses all of the claims in the "action" as a whole,
not simply the claims against a removing defendant. 3 The court noted
that both the substantive and procedural sections of CAFA refer to
removal of the class action 64 and further that a mass action shall be
deemed a class action under CAFA's removal provisions.65 The court
determined that a class action that is removable under CAFA may be
removed by any defendant without the consent of all of the defendants.66 The court concluded that these provisions, read together,
establish that one defendant may remove the entire action, including
claims against all defendants; thus the district court erred in holding
that the pre-CAFA defendants were not properly included in the
removal.6 7
The court then turned to the plaintiffs' argument that this action did
not qualify as a mass action under CAFA.6" The defendants contended
that although the action was not certified as a class action under state
or federal law, it was still deemed a class action for purposes of CAFA
because CAFA does not apply exclusively to class actions certified under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 2369 or its state analogues, and it
satisfied CAFA's mass action provisions, found at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)-

61. Appeal from a district court order granting remand to state court is allowed by
§ 1453(c)(1) of CAFA. Id. at 1192 n.21 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1) (2000)).
62. Id. at 1194. The plaintiffs argued, and the district court determined, that because
the action "commenced" against the pre-CAFA defendants before CAFA's February 18,2005
effective date, the pre-CAFA defendants could not join in the removal. Id.
63. Id. at 1196. The court noted that CAFA's 'reference to 'actions,' as opposed to
'claims,' suggests that removal under CAFA is broadly inclusive." Id. (citing Braud v.
Transp. Serv. Co., 445 F.3d 801, 808 (5th Cir. 2006)).
64. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(A)).
65. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b)).
66. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b)).
67. Id. at 1196-97.
68. Id. at 1198. CAFA defines a mass action as "any civil action (except a civil action
within the scope of [28 U.S.C. § 1711(2) (Supp. V 2005)]) in which monetary relief claims
of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs'
claims involve common questions of law or fact, except that jurisdiction shall exist only
over those plaintiffs whose claims in a mass action satisfy the jurisdictional amount
requirements under [28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)]." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i). Under § 1711(2)
class actions are defined as those certified either under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23
or a state equivalent to Rule 23. 28 U.S.C. § 1711(2); FED. R. CiV. P. 23. Class actions
under § 1711(2) could qualify for CAFA's expanded jurisdictional thresholds without
resorting to the mass action provisions in § 1332(d)(11). Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1202.
69. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
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(11).7o These provisions extend diversity jurisdiction to certain actions
the
brought individually by large groups of plaintiffs, even though
71
actions are not certified as a class under state or federal law.
Noting that "[t]he proper interpretation of CAFA's mass action
provisions is a matter of first impression in this circuit," the court held
that a mass action is to be treated as a class action under CAFA if it
meets certain statutory prerequisites.7 2 For a mass action to qualify for
CAFA diversity jurisdiction, the plaintiffs' claims must exceed an
aggregate of $5 million, and the parties must be minimally diverse.73
The court also addressed the numerosity requirement, deciding that a
mass action must involve the proposed "'monetary relief claims of 100
or more persons,'"7 4 and the commonality requirement, deciding that
"'the 75
plaintiffs' claims [must] involve common questions of law or
fact."'
The court then turned to the final clause of § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i)'s
definition of a mass action, which provides conditions under which
jurisdiction will exist in a mass action and states "'except that jurisdiction shall exist only over those plaintiffs whose claims in a mass action
satisfy the [$75,000] jurisdictional amount requirements under

70. Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1198 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)).
71. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)).
72. Id. at 1198-99 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(A)). A mass action is only deemed a
class action "if it otherwise meets the provisions" of §§ 1332(d)(2) through (10). 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d)(11)(A). Some of these incorporated provisions
act to limit CAFA's expansion of federal diversity jurisdiction by authorizing a
district court to decline jurisdiction over certain cases that may lack significant
interstate impact, or by creating an exception to jurisdiction for matters likely to
be purely local controversies. Other provisions create additional exceptions to
jurisdiction in suits against states and state officials and in certain securities
litigation. Some provide guidance on the treatment of citizenship under CAFA
[while] some provisions, despite being incorporated into the mass action context
... seem to have no application to mass actions.
Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1199-1200 (footnotes omitted) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(3)-(9)).
73. Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1201 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(2), (6)).
74. Id. at 1202 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i)). The court noted that "[tihis
provision... appears to limit mass actions to suits seeking monetary relief," and thus the
definition "does not extend to actions seeking solely equitable relief." Id. at 1202 n.45.
75. Id. at 1202 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i)). "Combining the requirements
drawn from § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i)'s definition of a mass action and those drawn from
§ 1332(d)(11)(A)'s incorporation of CAFA's class action requirements into the mass action
context," the court identified the following "four requirements for an action to be deemed
a mass action" under CAFA: (1) an amount in controversy of an aggregate of $5 million;
(2) minimal diversity; (3) a numerosity requirement for the monetary claims of 100 or more
plaintiffs; and (4) a commonality requirement that the plaintiffs' claims involve common
questions of law or fact. Id. at 1202-03.
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subsection (a).' , 6 The defendants argued that Congress intended the
word "except" to create an exception to mass action diversity jurisdiction,
such that even if the district court has jurisdiction over the action, it will
lack jurisdiction over individual plaintiffs whose claims do not exceed the
$75,000 minimum. The plaintiffs argued that Congress intended the
word "except" to mean "only," such that the $75,000 provision functions
as an additional primary requirement for subject matter jurisdiction.
The plaintiffs thus concluded that jurisdiction over a mass action would
only be proper if the four mass action requirements are met, and each
of the individual plaintiffs' claims exceeds $75,000.78 The district court
noted the tension between the $75,000 provision and the other mass
action provisions, but agreed with the plaintiffs and reasoned that "[i]f
there is internal inconsistency in CAFA, that inconsistency must be
resolved by giving predominance to the language that limits jurisdiction,
and not to language that would expand it."79
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed with this approach, holding that the
interpretation given by the district court and urged by the plaintiffs
failed to give effect to every word and clause in CAFA because it
aggregate amount in controversy threshold
rendered the $5 million
"mere surplusage.""° The court determined that if the plaintiffs'
individual claims could not be removed unless the claims of each
plaintiff exceed $75,000, the aggregate value of the claims of each of the
100 plaintiffs would be, at a minimum, $7.5 million. 81 The court held
that "[t]his approach negates the need for the $5,000,000 aggregate
amount in controversy requirement of § 1332(d)(2), which is applied to
mass actions through § 1332(d)(11)(A)." s2

76. Id. at 1203 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i)).
77. The defendants argued that the claims of these plaintiffs must be remanded to state
court.
78. Id. at 1203-04.
79. Lowery, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 1294.
80. Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1204-05. In reaching this conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit
utilized two well-established rules of statutory construction-(1) that it must "construe the
statute to give effect, if possible, to every word and clause" and (2) that it "must view the
provision in the context of the statute as a whole." Id. at 1204.
81. Id. at 1204.
82. Id. The court also held that the district court's interpretation ran afoul of the
legislative history of § 1332(d)(11). Id. at 1204-05. In so holding, the Eleventh Circuit
cited the Senate Judiciary Committee Report, S. REP. NO. 109-14 (2005), reprintedin 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, which "squarely confronts how the tension between the mass action
provisions is to be resolved." Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1206. The Committee Report provided
in pertinent part as follows:
"If a mass action satisfies the criteria set forth in [§ 1332(d)(11)] (that is, it
involves the monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons that are proposed to

1280

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

The court also disagreed with the defendants' approach, which
suggested that a district court could retain jurisdiction over an action
even if, eliminating individual claims, the total number of the plaintiffs
in the action fell below 100, or the aggregate total of the remaining
plaintiffs' claims fell below $5 million."3 Although the court did not
decide whether the $75,000 provision created an additional threshold
requirement that the party bearing the burden of establishing the court's
jurisdiction must prove at the outset, the court did decide that the
$75,000 provision did not supplant CAFA's plainly expressed $5 million
aggregate requirement by requiring a per-plaintiff minimum threshold
requirement that would ultimately require a showing of claims worth
$7.5 million in the aggregate.8 4
On the issue of which party has the burden of proof, the court
reaffirmed the rule it announced in Miedema v. Maytag Corp.8 5 and
Evans v. Walter Industries, Inc.16 when it joined the Second, Third,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits in following the settled practice of placing
the burden of establishing federal subject matter jurisdiction on the
removing defendant.8 7 After establishing that CAFA does not shift the
burden of proof in removal actions, the court in Lowery had to determine
the standard by which it measured the sufficiency of the defendants'
showing that the plaintiffs' claims exceeded $5 million in the aggregate. 8 The court first noted that in a removal context where damages
are unspecified, "the removing party bears the burden of establishing the
jurisdictional amount by a preponderance of the evidence,"89 but the

be tried jointly on the ground that the claims involve common questions of law or
fact and it meets the tests for federal diversity jurisdiction otherwise established
by the legislation), it may be removed to a federal court .... [It is the Committee's intent that any claims that are included in the mass action that standing
alone do not satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirements of Section 1332(a)
(currently $75,000), would be remanded to state court. Subsequent remands of
individual claims not meeting the section 1332 jurisdictional amount requirement
may take the action below the 100-plaintiff jurisdictional threshold or the $5
million aggregated jurisdictional amount requirement. However, so long as the
mass action met the various jurisdictional requirements at the time of removal,
it is the Committee's view that those subsequent remands should not extinguish
federal diversity jurisdictional [sic] over the action."
Id. at 1206 (quoting S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 47 (2005), reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 44).
83. Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1204.
84. Id. at 1206-07.
85. 450 F.3d 1322, 1328 (11th Cir. 2006).
86. 449 F.3d 1159, 1164 (11th Cir. 2006).
87. Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1208.
88. Id.
89. Id. (citing Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77 F.3d 1353, 1356-57 (11th Cir.
1996)).
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court acknowledged that in this case, damages were unspecified and only
the bare pleadings were available, and thus it could not apply the
preponderance standard meaningfully.9 0 Thus, the court looked to the
removal-remand scheme set forth in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1446(b) 9' and
1447(c) 9 2 and concluded that a district court is required to determine
the propriety of removal solely on the basis of the removing documents.9 3 "If the jurisdictional amount is either stated clearly on the
face of the documents before the court, or readily deducible from them,
then the court has jurisdiction. If not, the court must remand."94 The
court thus held that the district court must consider the documents that
the defendant received from the plaintiff, whether a complaint or a later
received paper, to determine if that document and the notice of removal

Specifically, the removing defendant must establish the amount in controversy by
"[tihe greater weight of the evidence, ... [a] superior evidentiary weight that,
though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still
sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than
the other."
Id. at 1209 (alteration in original) (brackets in original) (quoting BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY
1220 (8th ed. 2004)).
90. Id. at 1210. The court noted,
We have no evidence before us by which to make any informed assessment of the
amount in controversy.
All we have are the representations relating to
jurisdiction in the notice of removal and the allegations of the plaintiffs' third
amended complaint. As such, any attempt to engage in a preponderance of the
evidence assessment at this juncture would necessarily amount to unabashed
guesswork, and such speculation is frowned upon.
Id. at 1210-11 (citing Lindsey v. Ala. Tel. Co., 576 F.2d 593, 595 (5th Cir. 1978)).
91. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2000). Section 1446(b) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within thirty
days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of
the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or
proceeding is based ....
If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal
may be filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant, through service or
otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from
which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become
removable ....
Id.
92. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Section 1447(c) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect other than lack of subject
matter jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of
removal under section 1446(a). If at any time before final judgment it appears
that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be
remanded.
Id.
93. Lowery, 483 F,3d at 1211.
94. Id.
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unambiguously establish federal jurisdiction.95 If the notice of removal
and accompanying documents are insufficient to establish the jurisdictional requirements necessary for removal, "neither the defendants nor
the [district] court may speculate in an attempt to make up for the
notice's failings."96
Accordingly, the court held that a district court, when faced with
insufficient evidence to establish jurisdiction, could not invoke discovery
to supplement that evidence in assessing the propriety of removal. 97
Determining that "the defendant is not excused from the duty to show
by fact, and not mere conclusory allegation, that federal jurisdiction
exists," the court held that "by removing the action, [the defendant] has
represented to the court that the case belongs before it."9 ' Because the

95. Id. at 1213 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)).
96. Id. at 1214-15 (citing Lindsey, 576 F.2d at 595). The court further noted that the
defendant's counsel is bound by Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to file a
notice of removal only when counsel can do so in good faith. Id. at 1215 (citing FED. R. CIV.
P. 11). Thus, the court found it
highly questionable whether a defendant could ever file a notice of removal on
diversity grounds in a case such as the one [at bar]-where the defendant, the
party with the burden of proof, has only bare pleadings containing unspecified
damages on which to base its notice-without seriously testing the limits of
compliance with Rule 11.
Id. In such a case, the court determined that the defendant would need some "other paper"
to provide the grounds for removal under § 1446(b), and "[iun the absence of such a
document, the defendant's appraisal of the amount in controversy may be purely
speculative" and would not ordinarily provide grounds for his counsel to sign a notice of
removal in good faith. Id.
97. Id. at 1215. In so holding, the court noted that "[plost-removal discovery for the
purpose of establishing jurisdiction in diversity cases cannot be squared with the delicate
balance struck" by the language and the purpose of Rules 8(a) and 11 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a), 11. Rule 8(a) provides, in pertinent part, that
"[a] pleading which sets forth a claim for relief.., shall contain .. .a short and plain
statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends." FED. R. C1v. P. 8(a).
Rule 11 provides, in pertinent part, that
[bly presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later
advocating) a pleading ...an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that
to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an
inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, . . . the claims, defenses, and other
legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law [and] the allegations and
other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified,
are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b), (b)(2), (b)(3).
98. Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1217. The court noted,
Having made this representation, the defendant is no less subject to Rule 11 than
a plaintiff who files a claim originally. Thus, a defendant that files a notice of
removal prior to receiving clear evidence that the action satisfies the jurisdictional
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court held that allowing post-removal jurisdictional discovery "impermissibly lightens the defendant's burden of establishing jurisdiction," the
court decided that district courts should neither grant leave for the
defendants to engage in such discovery nor should they engage in their
own jurisdictional discovery99 The court further held that the defendants' request for post-removal jurisdictional discovery was "tantamount
to an admission that the defendants do not have a factual basis for
believing that jurisdiction exists [and t]he natural consequence of such
an admission is remand to state court."1" On the merits of the case
at bar, the court held that because the defendants were unable to
establish that the plaintiffs' claims exceeded $5 million in the aggregate,
the defendants were "unable to meet their burden of establishing the
requirements for federal jurisdiction over a mass action" under
CAFA. 1° 1
C. Whether a District Court Has the Authority to Circumvent the
Ten-Day Deadline of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure23(t) for
Obtaining Interlocutory Review of an Order Denying Class
Certification by Vacating and Reentering that Order After the Original
Deadlinefor Seeking Interlocutory Relief Has Expired
In Jenkins v. BellSouth Corp.,102 the Eleventh Circuit dealt with an
issue of first impression regarding a district court's power to circumvent
the ten-day deadline found in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f).1 °3
Rule 23(f) allows a court of appeals to grant plaintiffs an interlocutory
review of a district court's order denying class certification, so long as
the plaintiff applies for the review within ten days after the order is
entered.104 The Eleventh Circuit held that a district court may not
circumvent this ten-day deadline by vacating and reentering the order,

requirements, and then later faces a motion to remand, is in the same position as
a plaintiff in an original action facing a motion to dismiss.
Id. (footnote omitted).
99. Id. at 1218.
100. Id. at 1217-18.
101. Id. at 1221.
102. 491 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2007).
103. Rule 23(f) provides, in pertinent part, that "[a] court of appeals may in its
discretion permit an appeal from an order of a district court granting or denying class
action certification under this rule if application is made to it within ten days after entry
of the order." FED. R. CIV. P. 23(M.
104. Id.
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so as to establish a new ten-day deadline, after the original deadline for
seeking interlocutory relief expires. °5
The plaintiffs, current and former employees of defendant BellSouth
Corporation, commenced this putative class action by filing a complaint
against BellSouth in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Alabama, alleging that BellSouth had engaged in a pattern
and practice of racial discrimination in promotions and compensation.
On September 19, 2006, the district court denied class certification. On
October 3, 2006, the employees filed a motion for reconsideration of that
order, which the district court denied on November 7, 2006. On
November 24, 2006, the employees filed a petition in the Eleventh
Circuit under Rule 23(f) for permission to appeal the district court's
order denying the motion for reconsideration. 01 6 The Eleventh Circuit
dismissed the petition as untimely. 11 7 The employees then moved the
district court to vacate and reenter its November 7, 2006 order denying
their motion to reconsider class certification.0 ' On March 5, 2007, the
district court granted the employees' motion, vacated its November 7,
2006 order and reentered an identical order. On March 14, 2007, the
employees filed a second petition in the Eleventh Circuit under Rule
23(f), seeking permission to appeal the district court's March 5, 2007
order denying the employees' motion to reconsider class certification.0 9
Discussing whether the employees' second petition was timely, the
Eleventh Circuit noted that under Rule 23(f), "'[a] court of appeals may
in its discretion permit an appeal from an order of a district court
granting or denying class certification under this rule if application is
'
made to it within ten days after entry of the order.'""
The court also
noted that Rule 23(f)'s ten-day deadline "provides a single window of
opportunity to seek interlocutory review, and that window closes quickly
to promote judicial economy.""' Because "[a] motion for reconsidera-

105. Jenkins, 491 F.3d at 1289. In so holding, the Eleventh Circuit joined the Tenth,
Seventh, and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals on this issue. Id. at 1291.
106. Id. at 1289.
107. Id. (citing FED. R. CIv. P. 23(0).
108. Id. Because it was undisputed that the employees' motion was due on November
22, 2006, which was the day before Thanksgiving, the employees premised their argument
on excusable neglect from an alleged mistake by a courier service. Specifically, the
employees alleged that on November 21, 2006, they engaged a courier service to deliver the
motion to the court by overnight delivery, but the motion was not delivered until November
24, 2006, the day after Thanksgiving Day. Id. at 1289-90.
109. Id. at 1290.
110. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(0).
111. Id. (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f) advisory committee's note). "'The 10-day period
for seeking permission to appeal is designed to reduce the risk that attempted appeals will
disrupt continuing proceedings. It is expected that the courts of appeals will act quickly
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tion filed in the district court within ten days after the certification order
tolls the deadline for filing a petition under Rule 23(f) until the district
court rules on the motion,"" 2 the court held that the single window of
opportunity for the employees to seek interlocutory review of the district
court's denial of class certification closed on November 22, 2006, ten days
from the entry of the district court's original November 7, 2006 order
denying the employees' motion to reconsider class certification." 3 The
district court's March 5, 2007 order was irrelevant to the court's analysis
because "the district court was without the authority to circumvent [Rule
23(f)'s] ten-day deadline for obtaining interlocutory review of its order
denying class certification by vacating and reentering that order after
the original deadline for seeking interlocutory relief under Rule 23(f) had
expired."'14
The court rejected the employees' argument that 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), 1'5 which allows a district court to vacate and reenter a certification
order to allow a new period for filing a petition for interlocutory appeal,
should guide the court's interpretation of Rule 23(.16 Determining

in making the preliminary determination whether to permit appeal.'" Id. (quoting FED.
R. CIv. P. 23(f) advisory committee's note). The court also cited Gary v. Sheahan, 188 F.3d
891 (7th Cir. 1999), in which the Seventh Circuit held that Rule 23(f) provides "'only one
window of potential disruption,' which is 'deliberately small."' Jenkins, 491 F.3d at 1290
(quoting Gary, 188 F.3d at 893).
112. Jenkins, 491 F.3d at 1290 (citing Shin v. Cobb County Bd. of Educ., 248 F.3d 1061,
1064-65 (11th Cir. 2001)).
113. Id. at 1292.
114. Id.
115. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2000). Section 1292(b) provides in pertinent part as follows:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise
appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a
controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference
of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance
the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such
order. The Court of Appeals which would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such
action may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such
order, if application is made to it within ten days after the entry of the order.
Id.
116. Jenkins, 491 F.3d at 1290. The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that "[e]very
circuit that has considered the issue" agrees that a district court can reconsider the criteria
of § 1292(b), "'reenter the interlocutory order and thus trigger a new ten-day period."' Id.
(quoting Aparicio v. Swan Lake, 643 F.2d 1109, 1112 (5th Cir. Unit A Apr. 1981)). The
court also cited several cases in support of its contention that every circuit agrees on this
issue. Id. at 1290-91 (citing In re City of Memphis, 293 F.3d 345, 350 (6th Cir. 2002);
Safety-Kleen, Inc. v. Wyche, 274 F.3d 846, 867 (4th Cir. 2001); English v. Cody, 146 F.3d
1257, 1259 n.1 (10th Cir. 1998); Marisol ex rel. Forbes v. Giuliani, 104 F.3d 524, 528-29 (2d
Cir. 1996); In re Benny, 812 F.2d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987); Nuclear Eng'g Co. v. Scott,
660 F.2d 241, 247-48 (7th Cir. 1981); Braden v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 552 F.2d 948, 954-55
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that Rule 23(f) "'departs from the § 1292(b) model in two significant
ways,"'117 the court noted that unlike § 1292(b), Rule 23(f) neither
requires district courts to certify the class certification ruling for
appeal"' nor requires the class certification order to ""'involve[] a
controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for
difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order
may
119
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation."'
The Eleventh Circuit cited the Seventh Circuit's decision in Richardson Electronics, Ltd. v. Panache Broadcastingof Pennsylvania, Inc.,12°
which held that "'when a class-certification order is an arguable
candidate for a Rule 23(f) appeal, the appellants may not use section
1292(b) to circumvent the 10-day limitation in Rule 23(f)."' 12' The
court noted that the Seventh, Tenth, and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeal
had "rejected other attempts to circumvent the ten-day deadline of Rule
23(f)."' 2 2 The court further noted that "in enforcing the deadline of
Rule 23(f), what counts ordinarily is the original order denying or
granting class certification, not a later order that maintains the status
quo."' 23 The court therefore dismissed the employees' second petition

(3d Cir. 1977) (en banc); In re La Providencia Dev. Corp., 515 F.2d 94, 95 n.1 (1st Cir.
1975)).
117. Id. at 1291 (quoting FED. R. CIrv. P. 23(f) advisory committee's note and citing
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1802.2 (3d ed. 2005)).
118. Id. (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f) advisory committee's notes). "Under section
1292(b), both the district court and the court of appeals exercise discretion about granting
interlocutory review, but under Rule 23(f) only the court of appeals exercises that kind of
discretion." Id.
119. Id. (brackets in original) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f) advisory committee's notes
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)). The court noted that "[u]nder Rule 23(f), in contrast [to
§ 1292(b)], '[plermission to appeal may be granted or denied on the basis of any
consideration that the court of appeals finds persuasive.'" Id. (third brackets in original)
(quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f), advisory committee's note).
120. 202 F.3d 957 (7th Cir. 2000).
121. Jenkins, 491 F.3d at 1291 (quoting Richardson Elecs., 202 F.3d at 959).
122. Id. The Tenth Circuit, in DeltaAirlines v. Butler, 383 F.3d 1143 (10th Cir. 2004),
held that district courts do not have the authority to grant a motion that extends the time
period under Rule 23(f). Id. at 1145. The Seventh Circuit, in Gary, held that the
limitations period for interlocutory review is not tolled by a filing of a late or successive
motion to reconsider. 188 F.3d at 893. Lastly, the Fifth Circuit, in McNamara v.
Felderhof, 410 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2005), ruled that Rule 23(f)'s ten-day period cannot be
tolled by a late motion for reconsideration, no matter how the motion is styled. Id. at 281.
123. Jenkins, 491 F.3d at 1291 (citing Carpenter v. Boeing Co., 456 F.3d 1183, 1191
(10th Cir. 2006)). The court quoted from the Tenth Circuit, which stated that "'[a]n order
that leaves class-action status unchanged from what was determined by a prior order is
not an order granting or denying class action certification.'" Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Carpenter,456 F.3d at 1191). According to the court, the Fifth Circuit
reached the same conclusion. Id. (citing McNamara, 410 F.3d at 281).
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as untimely but stated that its decision "does not leave the employees
'
without an avenue for relief."124
"They can appeal the denial of class
certification following the entry of a final judgment."'2 5 "What they
cannot do at this late date is pursue an interlocutory appeal." 26
III.

CIVL PROCEDURE

A. Whether the Claims in an Amended Complaint Supersede the
Claims in the OriginalComplaint for the Purpose of Determining
FederalSubject Matter Jurisdiction
In Pintando v. Miami-Dade Housing Agency,'27 the Eleventh Circuit
held for the first time in a published opinion 2 ' that a district court
must look to the claims asserted in the amended complaint to determine
whether the court has federal subject matter jurisdiction.'2 9 Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court will be divested of
subject matter jurisdiction when subject matter jurisdiction is based on
a federal question and supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367,130 and the plaintiff amends his or her
complaint to omit the federal law claim originally giving rise to the
district court's supplemental jurisdiction of the remaining state law
claims. 3 '
The plaintiff, Juan Manuel Pintando, filed his original complaint
against the Miami-Dade Housing Authority ("MDHA") in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, alleging
violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964132 and two Florida
laws. 3' Pintando alleged that the district court had supplemental
jurisdiction over his state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.13

124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 1292.
Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000)).
Id.
501 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).

128. The Eleventh Circuit had addressed the jurisdictional issue at bar in its
unpublished opinion in Riley v. FairbanksCapital Corp., 222 F. App'x 897 (11th Cir. 2007).
129. Pintando,501 F.3d at 1243.
130. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000).
131. Pintando,501 F.3d at 1242.
132. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000).
133. Pintando,501 F.3d at 1242. Although it is not discussed in the opinion, it appears
that federal subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 did not exist because both Pintando and MDHA were citizens of Florida.

134. Id. Section 1367(a) provides, in pertinent part, that
in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the
district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are
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After MDHA moved for summary judgment on all counts, Pintando
moved to amend his complaint to "drop his federal law claim under Title
VII... so that he may continue to pursue only his state law claims."1' 35
The district court granted the motion, and Pintando filed an amended
complaint asserting only the state law claims. Although no violation of
federal law was alleged in the amended complaint, Pintando contended
that the district court still had supplemental jurisdiction over the case.
In its order granting summary judgment to MDHA on both state law
claims, the district court acknowledged that Pintando's amended
complaint did not contain a federal law claim, but concluded that it
retained supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law
claims. 136
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit noted that before deciding the merits
137
of the case, it must ensure that it has subject matter jurisdiction.
The court agreed that the district court had jurisdiction over the case
after Pintando filed his first complaint because the Title VII claim was
properly before the district court, and the state law claims were part of
the same nucleus of operative facts. 3 ' This allowed the district court
to properly exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.139 However, after Pintando amended his
complaint, there was no longer a federal question as grounds for
supplemental jurisdiction. 4 ° Thus, the question before the court was
whether the district court continued to maintain subject matter
jurisdiction over Pintando's state law claims after he amended his
complaint to remove all of the federal law claims. 4 '
Holding that the district court should have looked to the amended
complaint to determine subject matter jurisdiction, the Eleventh Circuit
cited the general rule that "'[an amended pleading supersedes the
former pleading; the original pleading is abandoned by the amendment,

so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form
part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States
Constitution.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
135. Pintando, 501 F.3d at 1242 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Pintando moved to amend his complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(a). Id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a).
136. Pintando, 501 F.3d at 1242.
137. Id. (citing Rolling Greens MHP, L.P. v. Comcast SCH Holdings L.L.C., 374 F.3d
1020, 1021 (11th Cir. 2004)).
138. Id. (citing United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966)).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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and is no longer a part of the pleader's averments against his adversary.'"142 Once the district court accepted the amended complaint, the
original complaint was superseded, and there was no longer a federal
claim on which the district court could exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over the state law claims.'4 3 The court also cited the United States
Supreme Court's 2007 opinion in Rockwell InternationalCorp. v. United
States,'44 for the premise that "'when a plaintiff files a complaint in
federal court and then voluntarily amends the complaint, courts look to
the amended complaint to determine jurisdiction."'1 4
The Supreme
Court in Rockwell cited opinions from the Seventh Circuit, which held
that subject matter jurisdiction must be determined by looking to the
amended complaint to determine if there was a "'federal claim to which
[the] state claims could be supplemental,'"' 6 and the Fifth Circuit,
which held that jurisdiction must be determined by looking at the
amended complaint because "'the plaintiff must be held to the jurisdictional consequences of a voluntary abandonment
of claims that would
14
otherwise provide federal jurisdiction.'
Following Rockwell the Eleventh Circuit in Pintando vacated the
district court's order for summary judgment and remanded the case to
be dismissed without prejudice.14' The court held that "[wihen Pintando amended his complaint and failed to include a Title VII claim or any
other federal claim, the basis for the district court's subject-matter

142. Id. at 1243 (brackets in original) (quoting Dresdner Bank AG, Dresdner Bank AG
in Hamburg v. M/V Olympia Voyager, 463 F.3d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 2006)). "'Under the
Federal Rules, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint."' Id. (quoting
Fritz v. Standard Sec. Life Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th Cir. 1982)).
143. Id.
144. 127 S. Ct. 1397 (2007).
145. Pintando, 501 F.3d at 1243 (quoting Rockwell, 127 S. Ct. at 1409). In Rockwell
the Supreme Court concluded that the withdrawal of allegations in an amended complaint
that had formed the basis of federal jurisdiction defeats jurisdiction. 127 S. Ct. at 1409.
146. Pintando, 501 F.3d at 1243 (brackets in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Wellness Cmty. Natl v. Wellness House, 70 F.3d 46, 50 (7th Cir. 1995)).
147. Id. (quoting Boelens v. Redman Homes, Inc., 759 F.2d 504, 508 (5th Cir. 1985)).
148. Id. at 1244 (citing Scarfo v. Ginsberg, 175 F.3d 957, 962 (11th Cir. 1999)). The
court quoted Scarfo for the proposition that "if a 'district court determines that subject[]matter jurisdiction over a plaintiffs federal claims does not exist, [the] court[] must
dismiss a plaintiffs state law claims."' Id. (brackets in original) (quoting Scarfo, 175 F.3d
at 962).
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jurisdiction ceased to exist."'49 Therefore, the district court should
have dismissed Pintando's claims without prejudice. 5 °
B. Whether a District Court Must ConsiderAll Factors that May
Warrant an Extension of Time to Effect Service Pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) if the PlaintiffHas Failed to Show Good
Cause for Failing to Timely Effect Service
In Lepone-Dempsey v. Carroll County Commissioners,15 ' the Eleventh
Circuit held that when a plaintiff fails to show good cause for failing to
effect timely service pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
4(m), 152 the district court must consider whether any circumstances,
such as the running of a statute of limitations, warrant an extension of
time to effect service under Rule 4(m).153 Only after considering such
factors may the district court dismiss
the case without prejudice for
4
failure to effect timely service.1
On April 17, 2003, the plaintiffs filed a complaint pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983' in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia, asserting that certain individual and governmental
149. Id. at 1243-44. In reaching this holding, the Eleventh Circuit differentiated
between a situation in which the plaintiff voluntarily amends the complaint to eliminate
the federal law claim and a situation in which a district court dismisses the federal claim
that created the original jurisdiction. Id. at 1242-43. The court acknowledged that a
district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if the district
court has dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction, but the court noted
that this situation was not analogous to a situation in which the plaintiff had voluntarily
removed the federal law claim from the amended complaint. Id.
The court also
distinguished cases involving voluntary dismissals of federal law claims from cases
removed to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2000), holding that in removed cases
the district court must look at the case at the time of removal to determine whether it had
subject matter jurisdiction, and that later changes to the pleadings do not impact the
court's exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. Pintando,501 F.3d at 1244 n.2. The United
States Supreme Court noted this distinction in Rockwell, when it held that "removal cases
raise forum-manipulation concerns that simply do not exist when it is the plaintiff who
chooses a federal forum and then pleads away jurisdiction through amendment." 127 S.
Ct. at 1409 n.6.
150. Pintando, 501 F.3d at 1244 (citing Scarfo, 175 F.3d at 962).
151. 476 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2007).
152. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(m). This rule requires a plaintiff to properly serve a defendant
with a summons and complaint within 120 days of the filing of the complaint. Id.
153. 476 F.3d at 1282.
154. Id. In so holding, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the holdings of the Seventh,
Fifth, Tenth, and Third Circuit Courts of Appeals. See id. at 1282 (citing Panaras v. Liquid
Carbonic Indus. Corp., 94 F.3d 338, 341 (7th Cir. 1996); Thompson v. Brown, 91 F.3d 20,
22 (5th Cir. 1996); Espinoza v. United States, 52 F.3d 838, 841 (10th Cir. 1995); Petrucelli
v. Bohringer & Ratzinger, 46 F.3d 1298, 1307-08 (3d Cir. 1995)).
155. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
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defendants, including the City of Villa Rica, violated the plaintiffs'
constitutional rights. On July 31, 2003, the plaintiffs' counsel asked the
city attorney to accept service on behalf of the defendants, and he
allegedly agreed. On that same day, the plaintiffs' counsel mailed the
city attorney copies of the complaint, summons, 'and request for waiver
of service forms, but the city attorney never returned them. The
plaintiffs did not otherwise attempt to serve the defendants, and none
15 6
of the defendants filed answers to the complaint.
On December 23, 2003, the defendants moved to dismiss the com15
plaint, arguing that the plaintiffs had failed to timely effect service.
The district court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint
without prejudice, finding that the plaintiffs had not timely served the
defendants and had not shown good cause for their failure to do so.' 58
The plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration, asking the district court
for an extension of time to serve the defendants to avoid being barred
from refiling suit due to the statute of limitations. The district court
denied the plaintiffs' motion without addressing the effect of the statute
of limitations on the plaintiffs' claims. The dismissal, although without
prejudice, effectively barred the plaintiffs from refiling suit against the
defendants because the statute of limitations had run. 59
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that the plaintiffs were
responsible for serving the defendants within 120 days after filing the
complaint pursuant to Rule 4(m).1 6' The court also acknowledged that
when a plaintiff fails to timely effect service pursuant to Rule 4(m), the
district court may dismiss the action without prejudice, or "'if the
plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court shall extend the time
for service for an appropriate period.'"'6 ' Although Eleventh Circuit
precedent provided that good cause exists "'only when some outside
factor[,] such as reliance on faulty advice, rather than inadvertence or
negligence, prevented service,"'162 the court noted that district courts

156. Lepone-Dempsey, 476 F.3d at 1279.
157. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs were required to serve the defendants
on or before August 15, 2003-120 days from the filing of the plaintiffs' complaint. Id. at
1279-80.
158. The plaintiffs argued that the defendants' motion should have been denied because
the city attorney had agreed to waive formal service. In the alternative, the plaintiffs
asked the district court for an extension of time to effect service. Id. at 1280.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1280-81.
161. Id. at 1281 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m)).
162. Id. (brackets in original) (quoting Prisco v. Frank, 929 F.2d 603, 604 (11th Cir.
1991) (per curiam)).
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have discretion to extend the time for service even in the absence of good
cause. 163
The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court that the plaintiffs
failed to demonstrate good cause for failing to timely serve the defendants,164 and the court acknowledged that it had not ever "specifically
stated that a district court must consider whether any factors warrant
an extension of time absent a showing of good cause." 1 5 However, the

court noted that "[o]ther circuits have held that if a plaintiff fails to
show good cause, the district court must still consider whether any
additional factors, such as the running of a statute of limitations, would
warrant a permissive extension of time" to effect service.'6 6 Relying
on the Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 4(m), the court held that an
extension of time for service may be justified in situations when the
167
applicable statute of limitations would bar refiling the action.
Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the dismissal, reasoning
that (1) the dismissal effectively barred the plaintiffs' claims because of
the effect of the statute of limitations and (2) the district court "did not
clearly consider, after finding that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate
good cause, whether a permissive extension of time was warranted under
the facts of [the] case.

' s

1

163. Id. (citing Horenkamp v. Van Winkle & Co., 402 F.3d 1129, 1132 (lth Cir. 2005)).
164. Id. Although the court noted that plaintiffs may have had good reason to believe
that they could rely on the city attorney's assertion that he would sign and return the
waiver forms, the plaintiffs were nonetheless responsible for formally serving the
defendants when the waiver forms were not returned. Id. at 1282. The court further noted
that the waiver of service procedure set forth in Rule 4(d) did not apply to local
governments, such as the City of Villa Rica, in the first place. Id. at 1281.
165. Id. at 1282.
166. Id. (citing Panaras,94 F.3d at 341; Thompson, 91 F.3d at 22; Espinoza, 52 F.3d
at 840-41; Petrucelli, 46 F.3d at 1307-08).
167. Id. (citing FED. R. Cv. P. 4(m) advisory committee's note).
168. Id. Although the running of the statute of limitations did not require the district
court to extend time for service of process under Rule 4(m), the Eleventh Circuit
determined that it was nonetheless "incumbent upon the district court to at least consider
this factor" in making its decision. Id.
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ARBITRATION

A. Whether § 11(a) of the FederalArbitrationAct, Which Allows a
District Court to Correct an "Evident Material Mistake in the Description of any Person, Thing, or Property Referred to in the Award,"
Covers a Mistake by a Party that Was Not Brought to the Attention of
the ArbitrationPanel Before the Panel Rendered the Award
The appeal in AIG Baker Sterling Heights, LLC v. American MultiCinema, Inc.,"' presented two primary questions, including one that
had divided the circuit 17
courts
about the interpretation of the Federal
0
Arbitration Act ("FAA"):
(1) whether section 11(a) of the [FAA], which allows a district court to
correct an "evident material mistake in the description of any person,
thing, or property referred to in the award," embraces a mistake by a
party that was not brought to the attention of the arbitration panel
before the panel rendered the award; and (2) whether state or federal
law governs the availability and amount of prejudgment interest in an
action to confirm an arbitration
award when jurisdiction is based on
7
diversity of citizenship.'
This action arose after the appellants, AIG Baker Sterling Heights,
LLC and A.B. Olathe II (collectively "Baker"), agreed with American
Multi-Cinema, Inc. ("American") to arbitrate a dispute over real estate
taxes owed on property that American leased from Baker. In the
arbitration, American erroneously admitted that it owed Baker
$226,771.76 for its share of real estate taxes for the year 2002. After the
arbitration panel awarded Baker $866,425.18, which included the
$226,771.76 for American's share of the 2002 taxes, American discovered

it had already paid these taxes in the greater amount of $248,624.57
when it paid the tax assessor directly rather than paying Baker.
Although American admitted that it did not provide this information to
the arbitration panel before the panel rendered its award, American
contended that it was entitled to a credit for this $248,624.57 payment
and that Baker's award should be reduced accordingly.'

169. 508 F.3d 995 (11th Cir. 2007).
170. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000).
171. AIG Baker Sterling Heights, LLC, 508 F.3d at 997 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 11(a)
(2000)).
172. Id. at 997-98. American contended that its erroneous admission to the arbitration
panel did not reflect the $248,624.57 payment to the tax assessor because American "did
not realize its mistake until it was preparing to pay the arbitration award." Id. at 998
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Baker filed an action in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama for confirmation of the award and for
prejudgment interest. American filed an answer and a counterclaim in
the district court along with a motion to correct the award with the
arbitration panel.173 The district court denied Baker's request for
confirmation and granted American's motion for modification on the
basis of an "evident material mistake." 74 The district court reduced
the balance of Baker's award by $248,624.57 and exercised its discretion
not to award prejudgment interest, and Baker appealed.'75
1. The District Court Did Not Have Authority to Modify the
Arbitration Award. On appeal, Baker first argued that the district
court exceeded its authority in modifying Baker's award under the
FAA.'76 The district court relied on § 11(a) of the FAA, which allows
a district court to modify an arbitration award when there was "'an
evident material mistake in the description of any person, thing, or
property referred to in the award. ' 1 7 The district court modified
Baker's award because it found the failure of the stipulated facts to
reflect American's $248,624.57 payment to the tax assessor to be an
"evident material mistake." 78
The Eleventh Circuit first noted that § 11(a)'s plain language
embraces only an evident material mistake that appears "in the
award." 7 9 Because the arbitration panel crafts the award, only the
panel can make a mistake in the award, and the panel did not make a
"'mistake'" because it did not "'understand [anything] wrongly"' or

(internal quotation marks omitted).
173. Id. at 997-98. American also filed a separate action in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Missouri to modify the award. This action was
transferred to the Northern District of Alabama, and it was consolidated with Baker's
action seeking confirmation. The arbitration panel concluded that American's motion to
correct the award was untimely. Id.
174. Id. at 998 (internal quotation marks omitted).
175. Id. at 998-99.
176. Id. at 999.
177. AIG Baker Sterling Heights, LLC, 508 F.3d at 999 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 11(a)).
178. Id. at 998.
179. Id. (citing 9 U.S.C. § 11(a)). The Eleventh Circuit further held that it would reach
the same conclusion even assuming the language of § 11(a) was ambiguous. Id. at 1000.
The court noted that the words of§ 11(a) had an established meaning at the time that they
were adopted from the State of New York's arbitration law that was enacted in 1920, 1920
N.Y. Laws 803 (codified as amended at N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7501-7514 (McKinney 1998 & Supp.
2008)), which provided that a mistake or miscalculation which would justify modification
of an award must have appeared in the award "'on its face.'" AIG Baker Sterling Heights,
LLC, 508 F.3d at 1000-01 (quoting In re Burke, 84 N.E. 405, 406 (N.Y. 1908)).
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"'recognize or identify [anything] incorrectly.'" 8 0 Rather, the panel
"lacked knowledge" about the tax payment because American never
provided this information to the panel before it rendered its award."'
Although "[t]he arbitration award that Baker received may [have been]
a product of ignorance attributable to an oversight by American," the
not contain an evident material mistake
court held that the award8 did
2
under § 11(a) of the FAA.'
The Eleventh Circuit held that this reading of § 11(a) was consistent
with the purpose of the FAA, which is "'to relieve congestion in the
courts and to provide parties with an alternative method for dispute
The
resolution that is speedier and less costly than litigation. 1
court noted that "judicial review of arbitration decisions is 'among the
narrowest known to the law,'"'18 and "[tihat narrow review is why a
court cannot vacate an arbitration award for fraud based on information
that the parties, through lack
available before or during the arbitration
188
of diligence, failed to discover."
2. State Law Governs the Availability and Amount of Prejudgment Interest. The second issue before the court was whether state
or federal law governed the availability and amount of prejudgment
The court first
interest in diversity cases involving the FAA.8

180. AIG Baker Sterling Heights, LLC, 508 F.3d at 999 (quoting WEBSTER'S II NEW
RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 759 (1984)).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 999-1000. In so holding, the Eleventh Circuit rejected American's reliance
on the Fourth Circuit's holding in Transnitro,Inc. v. MIV Wave, 943 F.2d 471 (4th Cir.
1991), which interpreted § 11(a) to embrace mistakes made by parties that were never
brought to the arbitration panel's attention. AIG Baker Sterling Heights, LLC, 508 F.3d
at 100 (citing Transnitro,943 F.2d at 474). Determining that the holding in Transnitro
was erroneous, the Eleventh Circuit looked to the Fourth Circuit's more recent holding in
Apex Plumbing Supply, Inc. v. U.S. Supply Co., 142 F.3d 188 (4th Cir. 1998), which was
consistent with the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation and "held that a mistake 'was not
evident because it did not appear on the face of the arbitration award.'" AIG Baker
SterlingHeights, LLC, 508 F.3d at 1000 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Apex
Plumbing Supply, Inc., 142 F.3d at 194).
183. AIG Baker SterlingHeights, LLC, 508 F.3d at 1001 (quoting Caley v. Gulfstream
Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1367 (11th Cir. 2005)).
184. Id. (quoting Del Casal v. E. Airlines, Inc., 634 F.2d 295, 298 (5th Cir. Unit B Jan.
1981)).
185. Id. (citing Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378, 1383 (11th Cir.
1988)).
186. Id. at 997. The court noted that the district court's rationale for not awarding
prejudgment interest could be read in two ways: (1) "[e]ither the district court determined
that it had discretion to decline to grant prejudgment interest under federal law," or (2) "it
determined that prejudgment interest [was] unavailable because the award was modified
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determined that because the district court's jurisdiction was based on
diversity of citizenship, state law governed Baker's entitlement to
prejudgment interest.17 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit held that the
district court erred to the extent it exercised jurisdiction under federal
88
law to decline to award prejudgment interest."
Although "[a]n
exception to this general rule exists when 'affirmative countervailing
federal interests are at stake that warrant application of federal
law, ') 18 9 the court noted that the FAA, which "'creates a body of
federal substantive law establishing and regulating the duty to honor an
agreement to arbitrate, yet.., does not create... independent federalquestion jurisdiction,"' does not place countervailing federal interests at
stake.' s The Eleventh Circuit thus joined the Fifth Circuit and the
Ninth Circuit in holding that state law governs the availability and
amount of prejudgment interest in diversity cases involving the
FAA.191
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court erred to the
extent that it found that prejudgment interest was unavailable because
the arbitration award was modified rather than confirmed.' 92 Because
a judgment entered on an arbitration award under the FAA has the
force and effect of a judgment recovered in any other civil action
regardless of whether the court enters an order "'confirming, modifying,

rather than confirmed." Id. at 1001. Determining that the district court erred under either
possible reading, the Eleventh Circuit addressed each of the readings in turn. Id.
187. Id. at 1001. "In diversity cases, the availability and amount of prejudgment
interest is ordinarily governed by state law." Id. (citing Venn v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 1058, 1066-67 (11th Cir. 1996)).
188. Id. The Eleventh Circuit rejected American's argument that federal law governs
the availability and amount of prejudgment interest whenever federal law provides a rule
of decision. Id. at 1002. American relied on an admiralty case, and the Eleventh Circuit
has held that "admiralty law is a context in which a countervailing federal interest-'the
federal interest in uniformity'-sometimes requires a choice of federal common law rather
than state law." Id. (quoting Mink v. Genmar Indus. Inc., 29 F.3d 1543, 1548 (11th Cir.
1994)).
189. Id. at 1001-02 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Esfeld v. Costa
Crociere, S.P.A., 289 F.3d 1300, 1307 (11th Cir. 2002)).
190. Id. at 1002 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983)). The court held that "[i]n the absence of a federal interest that
requires the application of federal law, the existence of a federal rule of decision in a
diversity case does not affect the question whether the availability and amount of
prejudgment interest is governed by state or federal law." Id.
191. Id. (citing Executone Info. Sys., Inc. v. Davis, 26 F.3d 1314, 1329 (5th Cir. 1994);
Northrop Corp. v. Triad Intl Mktg. S.A., 842 F.2d 1154, 1155 (9th Cir. 1988)).
192. Id.
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or correcting the award,'"19 3 the court held that the district court erred
to the extent it ruled otherwise."'
V.

SECURITIES

A. Whether Investors in an Arm's-Length Merger Can Recover Under
Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 If They Make a Legally
Binding Investment Commitment Before the Issuance of a Defective
Registration Statement
In APA Excelsior III L.P v. Premiere Technologies, Inc.,195 the
Eleventh Circuit held, as a matter of first impression, that investors
involved in an arm's-length merger transaction are not entitled to
recover under the fraud provisions of section 11 of the Securities Act of
1933... if they make a legally binding investment commitment before
197
the issuance of a defective registration statement.
The dispute arose out of a merger between Xpedite Systems, Inc.
("Xpedite") and Premiere Technologies, Inc. ("Premiere"). The plaintiffs
were former shareholders of Xpedite. Xpedite began a due diligence
investigation of Premiere after it expressed interest in acquiring
Xpedite. 19s Although the plaintiffs were sophisticated investors with
due diligence rights, they failed to exercise these rights in any meaningful way. 199 Despite their superficial due diligence, Xpedite's board

193. Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 13 (2000)).
194. Id. at 1003. The Eleventh Circuit noted that its 'decision that state law governs
the availability and amount of prejudgment interest is not the end of the matter," but on
remand, the district court must determine, under the applicable choice-of-law rules, which
state law governs the availability and amount of interest. Id.
195. 476 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2007).
196. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2000).

197. 476 F.3d at 1267, 1277.
198. Id. at 1263-64. Premiere provided telecommunication services including voice
messaging, conference calling, and telephone calling-card related services. Id.
199. Id. at 1264. For example, the plaintiffs did not (1) direct anyone to examine
Premiere's key telephone calling card customers, (2) negotiate for specific warranties
concerning the calling card business, or (3) direct anyone to perform due diligence
concerning the technical capacity of the calling card business's software platform. The
plaintiffs were also informed by Xpedite's former CEO that Premiere's contract and
business dealings with a particular telephone calling card customer, DigiTEC 2000, Inc.
("DigiTEC"), were important to Premiere's revenues. However, the plaintiffs neither
recalled performing any examination of the DigiTEC account, nor did they recall directing
anyone to make contact with that company as part of the due diligence efforts. Further,
although the plaintiffs believed Xpedite's due diligence team had access to Premiere's
accounts receivable for the telephone calling card business, the plaintiffs did not review
them personally or direct anyone else to do so. Id.
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entered into a merger agreement with Premiere on November 13, 1997,
and voted unanimously to recommend the merger to Xpedite shareholders. Premiere required the plaintiffs to execute stockholder agreements
in which they granted irrevocable proxies to Premiere to vote their
Xpedite stock in favor of the merger.200 Premiere also required the
plaintiffs to execute affiliate letters in which the plaintiffs warranted
that they understood that Premiere was "under no obligation to file a
registration statement with the [Securities and Exchange Commission
('SEC')] covering the disposition of [their] shares."" 1
More than two months later, on January 28, 1998, Premiere's
registration statement for the Xpedite merger became effective. On
February 27, 1998, a majority of Xpedite's and Premiere's shareholders
voted to approve the merger. On June 9 and 10, 1998, Premiere
announced that it would have a shortfall in its revenues and would take
a charge against its bad debt reserve. The information in the announcement was not mentioned in the registration statement. On June 10,
1998, the price of Premiere stock dropped from $14.4375 per share to
$10.375 per share.20 2
In November 1998 the plaintiffs filed suit against Premiere, asserting
claims for breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and violations
of several different provisions of the Securities Act. The plaintiffs
claimed that the decline in stock price was the result of other false and
misleading statements or omissions about Premiere's financial condition
in the registration statement. 0 3 The plaintiffs alleged that these
misstatements and omissions were material and violated section 11 of
the Securities Act, which provides a cause of action for persons who
acquire securities in reliance upon a false or misleading registration
statement and creates a presumption of reliance that any person

200. Id.
201. Id. at 1264-65 (brackets in original) (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The affiliate letters set forth potential limitations on the transferability of the
Premiere securities that the plaintiffs would receive upon consummation of the merger.
Id. at 1264.
202. Id. at 1265. This drop in stock price constituted a "one-day decline of 28 percent
and an overall decline of 69 percent from the merger price." Id.
203. The plaintiffs alleged that Premiere (1) overstated its prior acquisitions of, and
attempts to integrate, two voice messaging businesses; (2) misrepresented the status and
viability of a product; (3) failed to disclose that Premiere was experiencing dramatic
declines in revenues from business relationships with two other entities, DigiTEC and
Amway Corporation; and (4) "touted that Premiere had a 'strategy' to become 'the world's
leading provider of network based enhanced personal communication services,' yet
Premiere lacked sufficient internal controls and management capability to manage its
growth and integrate its acquisitions," or to properly assess customer credit risks. Id.
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acquiring such securities was legally harmed by the defective registration statement. °4
The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on
some of the plaintiffs' Securities Act claims, finding that the plaintiffs
lacked standing under the Securities Act because they acquired the
securities through a private offering. The district court also granted
summary judgment to the defendants on the plaintiffs' misrepresentation claims, concluding that the plaintiffs could not establish that they
reasonably relied upon the alleged misrepresentations. 20 5 The plaintiffs appealed and set the stage for the first appeal, in which the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants on the
misrepresentation claims but reversed summary judgment on the lack
of standing for the Securities Act claims, noting that "the securities had
26
been obtained via an 'integrated' (and thus public) offering." 0
Notably, the court determined that the defendants did not make the
related (and seemingly more attractive) argument that because the
plaintiffs made their investment commitment before the issuance of the
registration statement, the plaintiffs could not have relied upon the
registration statement and should not be entitled to maintain their

claims under section

11.207

Following remand to the district court, the defendants filed a renewed
motion for summary judgment based on the Eleventh Circuit's discussion
of the potential bar to the plaintiffs' section 11 claim alluded to in its
prior opinion. 0 8 The district court granted the defendants' renewed
motion, finding that "[iun light of the timing of Plaintiffs' commitment
and their sophistication and access to inside information, coupled with
their failure to conduct meaningful due diligence," the plaintiffs were not
within the class of individuals that the Securities Act intended to

204. Id. at 1265, 1270-71 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)).
205. Id. at 1266. The district court dismissed certain of the plaintiffs' Securities Act
claims and their claims for breach of contract. Id.
206. Id. (quoting APA Excelsior III L.P. v. Premiere Techs., Inc., 122 F. App'x 985 (11th
The Eleventh Circuit initially concluded that the plaintiffs' negligent
Cir. 2004)).
misrepresentation claims failed because the plaintiffs "failed to exercise reasonable due
diligence despite the fact they knew or should have known of the general problems of which
they complained." Id. Specifically, the court determined that the plaintiffs were on notice
of the problems with Premiere integrating new acquisitions, the possibility of difficulties
in launching several products, and Premiere's general business relationships with licensees;
yet the plaintiffs failed to adequately investigate these problem areas. Id.
207. Id. The Eleventh Circuit stated that this impossibility of reliance concept might
"'go to'" the actual merits of a section 11 claim, but because the defendants had not directly
raised the issue, the court did not decide it at that point. Id. (quoting APA Excelsior III
L.P., 122 F. App'x at 16 n.9).
208. Id.
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protect, and reliance on the allegedly defective registration statement
was impossible under the facts of the case.20 9 This second summary
judgment ruling was at issue in the 2007 appeal.210
The Eleventh Circuit recognized that the issue for determination in
this appeal, which involved application of the "commitment theory"
under section 11, was one of first impression.2 1' Under the commitment theory, once an investment decision is made and the parties are
committed to the transaction, "'there is little justification for penalizing
alleged omissions or misstatements which occur thereafter and which
have no effect on the decision.'" 212 Examining the defendants' "impossibility of reliance" argument, the court first looked to the language of
section 11 itself, which provides in pertinent part, as follows:

209.

Id. at 1266-67. In so holding, the district court relied on Guenther v. Cooper Life

Scis., Inc., 759 F. Supp. 1437 (N.D. Cal. 1990), which had been referenced in the Eleventh
Circuit's prior opinion. APA Excelsior III L.P., 476 F.3d at 1267.
210. APA Excelsior III L.P., 476 F.3d at 1267.
211. Id. "As both the prior panel and district court acknowledged, and as the parties
agree, hours of research have not uncovered any case directly on point." Id.
212. Id. (quoting SEC v. Nat'l Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 703-04 (D.D.C.
1978)). The defendants initially advanced a commitment theory argument in a motion to
dismiss. The district court disagreed, finding the commitment theory to be inapplicable
because the plaintiffs "did not irrevocably commit themselves to the acquisition of Premiere
stock by executing the Stockholder Agreements." Id. at 1269 (internal quotation marks
omitted). In so holding, the district court relied on a line of cases that stood for the general
proposition that 'in order for the commitment theory to apply, the investment decision and
commitment must be irrevocable." Id. (citing Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. '21' Intl
Holdings, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 212, 215-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)). The Eleventh Circuit noted that
the "commitment theory applies once the investment decision is made and the parties are
irrevocably committed to the transaction." Id. (citing Westinghouse, 821 F. Supp. at 21516). The court noted that, in its prior decision, it had stated that the plaintiffs "made their
investment commitment before the filing of the registration statement and, therefore,
reliance on the registration statement would have been impossible." Id. The court also
observed that the district court found on remand that these statements were not dicta, but
instead the statements called the prior holding into question and therefore constituted new
law of the case. Id. As the Eleventh Circuit observed, in light of this reading of its prior
decision, the district court ruled that the plaintiffs made their investment decision and
committed to purchase their shares prior to the issuance of the registration statement. Id.
On appeal, the plaintiffs did not challenge the district court's decision other than to argue
that "the timing of their commitment was 'irrelevant' for Section 11 purposes and that
impossibility of reliance [was] no bar to their claim." Id. Because the plaintiffs did not
raise this issue in their initial briefs, the court was not required to decide it. Id. Thus, the
court accepted the prior panel's conclusion (and the district court's express holding on
remand) that the plaintiffs made a binding investment commitment prior to the issuance
of the registration statement. Id. The court then considered the effect of that holding on
the disposition of the instant appeal. Id. at 1270.
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"In case any part of the registration statement, when such part
became effective, contained an untrue statement of a material fact or
omitted to state a material fact required to be stated therein or
necessary to make the statements therein not misleading, any person
acquiring such security (unless it is proved that at the time of such
acquisition he knew of such untruth or omission) may [file suit], either
at law or in equity, in any court of competent jurisdiction."213

Section 11 "creates a presumption that 'any person acquiring such
security' was legally harmed by the defective registration statement."214 Intentional or willful conduct is not required under section
11, and liability will attach even for "'innocent misstatements. '' 215 To
recover under the statute, the plaintiff only has to show a material
misstatement or omission in the registration statement and "be able to
'trace' the security he acquired to that defective statement."2 16

213. Id. at 1271 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)).
214. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) and citing Kirkwood v. Taylor, 590 F. Supp. 1375,
1377 (D. Minn. 1984)).

The statute then sets out the post-twelve months earnings period requirements:
"If such person acquired the security after the issuer has made generally available
to its security holders an earning statement covering a period of at least twelve
months beginning after the effective date of the registration statement, then the
right of recovery under this subsection shall be conditioned on proof that such
person acquired the security relying upon such untrue statement in the
registration statement or relying upon the registration statement and not knowing
of such omission, but such reliance may be established without proof of the
reading of the registration statement by such person."
Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)). Thus, the presumption of reliance "ends after an earnings
statement which covers a period of at least twelve months after the effective date of the
registration statement has become available." Id.; accord Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269,
272 (2d Cir. 1967); see also Unicorn Field, Inc. v. Cannon Group, Inc., 60 F.R.D. 217, 227
(S.D.N.Y. 1973). A section 11 plaintiff need not show he or she actually relied on the
registration statement unless he or she acquired the security "'after the issuer has made
generally available to its security holders an earnings statement covering a period of at
least twelve months beginning after the effective date of the registration statement.'" APA
Excelsior III L.P., 476 F.3d at 1271 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)). This is because "'there
is a conclusive presumption of reliance for any person purchasing the security prior to the
expiration of twelve months."' Id. (quoting 1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES
REGULATION § 7.3[4], at 587 (4th ed. 2002)). Because the plaintiffs in the case at bar did

not acquire their Premiere stock after the issuance of a twelve-month earnings statement,
if the section 11 presumption applied, it would mean reliance is "conclusively presumed."
Id.
215. APA Excelsior III L.P., 476 F.3d at 1271 (quoting Herman & MacLean v.
Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983)).
216. Id. (citing Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 382; Barnes, 373 F.2d at 273). In other words,
the plaintiff "must show that the security was issued under, and was the direct subject of,
the prospectus and registration statement being challenged." Id. (citing Barnes, 373 F.3d
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The plaintiffs claimed that reliance was irrelevant because it is not an
element of a section 11 claim. The plaintiffs also argued that because
their Premiere stock was eventually issued under a defective registration
statement and was not stock previously issued and already in the open
market, they had established a prima facie case under section 11.217
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, holding that the plaintiffs' argument
presupposes that the section 11 presumption applies in the first place,
which it does not.218 Because the concept of reliance was important to
Congress in drafting section 11,219 the court had to decide "whether
Congress intended this presumption to apply (or whether a purchaser of
security falls outside the reach and scope of the statute) when reliance
220
is rendered impossible by virtue of a pre-registration commitment."
Determining Congress did not so intend, the court held that the
plaintiffs were not entitled to a presumption of reliance "in light of the
timing of their investment decision and commitment."221 The court
stated, "[Ilt would be illogical to cloak Plaintiffs with a presumption of
reliance. Plaintiffs made their investment decision and were legally
committed to the transaction (and thus could not possibly have relied on
the registration statement) months before the registration statement was
in existence." 222 The court determined that support in the legislative
history of section 11, which revealed that Congress did not intend for the
presumption of reliance to apply to a situation if there was a binding
preregistration commitment. 22' Rather, "Congress assumed that only

at 273).
217. Id. at 1271-73. The plaintiffs argued that section 11 "is the equivalent of a strict
liability statute." Id. at 1272.
218. Id. at 1273. The court agreed with the plaintiffs to the extent that they argued
reliance need not be proven; rather, "reliance is ordinarily presumed." Id. at 1272 (citing
Barnes, 373 F.2d at 272). The court noted the exception that reliance would need to be
proven in cases involving post-earnings statements. Id.
219. Id. at 1272. The court noted that "[t]he House Report accompanying the version
of the bill that ultimately became the Securities Act explains that responsibility under
Section 11 is enforced against 'those who purport to issue statements for the public's reliance.'" Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 9 (1933)). The Court further noted,
Congress made clear that the no-fault nature of Section 11 is specifically based on
the legal principle that if one of two innocent persons must bear a loss, "he should
bear it who has the opportunity to learn the truth and has allowed untruths to be
published and relied upon. Moreover, he should suffer the loss who occupies a
position of trust in the issuing corporation toward the stockholders, rather than
the buyer of a stock who must rely upon what he is told."
Id. (emphasis added by the court) (quoting S. REP. No. 73-47, at 5 (1933)).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1273.
222. Id. (citing Lewis v. McGraw, 619 F.2d 192, 195 (2d Cir. 1980)).
223. Id.

2008]

TRIAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE

1303

those who acquired their stock after the effective date of the registration
statement would be affected by material defects."" 4 The court also
decided that the tracing requirements in section 11 that require a
plaintiff to trace his or her stock to the defective registration statement
to have standing and prevail on a section 11 claim reinforced the
conclusion.225 Thus, the court determined the presumption of reliance
"should only apply to those who purchase securities at the time of or
after the registration statement."22 6
Finally, the court reiterated that the plaintiffs were investors who
"had access to a wide range of inside information and knew of the stock
issuance months before the registration statement was filed."227 The
plaintiffs had the opportunity to learn, and were on notice, of the
potential problems of which they complained. 22" Because the plaintiffs,
"by virtue of their binding commitment decision, effectively 'purchased'
their Premiere stock months before the registration statement was filed,"
the plaintiffs could not have purchased pursuant to the registration
statement.22 9 Thus, the court affirmed the district court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of the defendants, holding that the section
11 presumption of reliance "does not apply in the limited and narrow
situation where sophisticated investors participating in an arms-length
corporate merger make a legally binding investment commitment
230
months before the filing of a defective registration statement."

224. Id. The court determined Congress "simply eliminated the requirement that they
must prove that they had read and relied upon the defective registration statement." Id.
Section l1's presumption of reliance is justified "because, even though the purchaser may
not read and rely on the registration statement, the misstatements and omissions
contained therein are reasonably assumed to affect the market price." Id. at 1274 (citing
H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 10).
225. Id. at 1276. If stock is purchased before a defective registration statement is
issued, the purchaser necessarily falls outside the scope of section 11. Id. (citing Barnes,
373 F.2d at 273; Turner v. First Wis. Mortgage Trust, 454 F. Supp. 899, 911 (E.D. Wis.
1978)).
226. Id. at 1274 (citing H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 22). The court found further support
for its conclusion in the post-earnings statement exception to the presumption, which
"places the burden on the purchaser to show that he actually relied on the defective
registration statement if an intervening earnings statement has been issued." Id. at 1275.
"In other words, Congress made an exception to the Section 11 presumption when 'in all
likelihood' the purchase decision was based on factors other than the registration
statement." Id.
227. Id. at 1277.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1276. The court pointed out that this was particularly true in the plaintiffs'
case, given that no registration statement was even required for their shares under the
affiliate letters. Id.
230. Id. at 1277.
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SOCIAL SECURITY

A. Whether the Doctrine of Equitable Tolling is Available to a
Claimant Whose District Court Challenge to a Decision of the Commissioner of Social Security Is Barred by the Sixty-Day Statute of Limitations in 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
In Jackson v. Astrue,23 ' the Eleventh Circuit held that the doctrine
of equitable tolling applied to the sixty-day statute of limitations in 42
U.S.C. § 405(g) 232 when a claimant failed to file her challenge to a
decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner")
within that sixty-day period.2 33 This code section provides for federal
court review of administrative denials of applications for Supplemental
Security Income ("SSI"), filed under Title XVI of the Social Security Act
("SSA").234 The court also held, for the first time in a published
opinion, that traditional equitable tolling principles require a claimant
an untimely filing by a showing of extraordinary circumstancto justify
23 5
es.
On August 31, 2004, the plaintiff Patricia Jackson applied for SSI
benefits for injuries sustained in an automobile accident. On February
3, 2006, an administrative law judge ("ALJ") denied Jackson's petition
on the ground that her injuries did not qualify as "disabilities" under the
SSA. On April 21, 2006, the SSA's Appeals Council denied Jackson's
request for review, at which point the ALJ's decision became final and
subject to federal court review under § 405(g). 23 6 On that same day,
the Appeals Council sent a letter to Jackson advising her of its denial of
her request for review, wherein it advised Jackson "to file her complaint

231. 506 F.3d 1349 (11th Cir. 2007).
232. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2000).
233. 506 F.3d at 1353 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)).
234. Id. at 1351; 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) (2000).
235. Jackson, 506 F.3d at 1353.
236. Id. at 1351. Section 405(g) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
"Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in
controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced
within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such decision or within such
further time as the Commissioner of Social Security may allow. Such action shall
be brought in the district court of the United States for the judicial district in
which the plaintiff resides, or has his principal place of business, or, if he does not
reside or have his principal place of business within any such judicial district, in
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia."
Id. at 1351 n.1 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)).
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in the United States District Court for the judicial district in which she

237
lives within sixty days from the date of her receipt of the letter."
The Appeals Council's letter also informed Jackson that it would assume
she received the letter "5 days after the date on it unless you show us
that you did not receive it within the 5-day period."2 8 According to
the Appeals Council's letter and consistent with the sixty-day statute of
limitations in § 405(g), Jackson was required to file her complaint in the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama on or
before June 26, 2006.239
Instead, Jackson filed a pro se complaint on June 20, 2006, challenging the Commissioner's denial of her SSI claim in Alabama state court.
On July 13, 2006, the state court dismissed Jackson's complaint for lack
of jurisdiction. On July 18, 2006, twenty-two days after the sixty-day
statute of limitations had expired, Jackson filed a complaint in the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. The
Commissioner successfully moved to dismiss Jackson's petition on the
240
ground that the complaint was untimely.
On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, Jackson argued, this time through
counsel, that the district court erred in dismissing her complaint because
the doctrine of equitable tolling excused her untimely filing. Jackson
argued that Congress explicitly intended for equitable tolling to apply to
the SSA's statute of limitations.24 '
Citing the SSA's permissive
approach to equitable tolling, Jackson also challenged the district court's
application of Burnett v. New York Central Railroad Co.,242 a case
concerning equitable tolling in the context of the
Federal Employer's
2 44
243
to the facts of her case.
Liability Act ("FELA"),
The Eleventh Circuit agreed with Jackson and held that the doctrine
245
of equitable tolling applied to § 405(g)'s statute of limitations.
However, the court further held that traditional equitable tolling
principles required Jackson to justify her untimely filing by a showing
of extraordinary circumstances. 24 ' These "extraordinary circumstanc-

237. Id. at 1351-52 (internal quotation marks omitted).
238. Id. at 1352 (internal quotation marks omitted).
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. 380 U.S. 424 (1965).
243. 45 U.S.C. § 56 (2000).
244. Jackson, 506 F.3d at 1352.
245. Id. at 1353 (citing Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 480 (1986)).
246. Id. (citing Waller v. Comm'r, 168 F. App'x 919, 921 (1lth Cir. 2006) (per curiam)).
The court cited the Supreme Court's opinion in Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467
(1986), and stated "'that application of a traditional equitable tolling principle to the 60-day
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es" may exist when "'the defendant misleads the plaintiff, allowing the
statutory period to lapse; or when the plaintiff has no reasonable way of
discovering the wrong perpetrated against her.'"247 The court determined that requiring a claimant to justify equitable tolling of the SSA's
statute of limitations by establishing extraordinary circumstances was
fully consistent with its approach to equitable tolling in other contexts.24s

In support of her equitable tolling argument, Jackson first alleged that
she had shown "good cause" for her untimely filing as that term is
defined in 20 C.F.R. § 416.1411.249

The court rejected this argument

because the good cause standard set forth in that regulation only applies
in cases when a claimant requests the Appeals Council to extend the

requirement of § 405(g) is fully consistent with the congressional purpose and is nowhere
eschewed by Congress.'" Jackson, 506 F.3d at 1353 (quoting Bowen, 476 U.S. at 480).
247. Jackson, 506 F.3d at 1353 (quoting Waller, 168 F. App'x at 921). The court quoted
with approval the Second Circuit's opinion in Torres v. Barnhardt,417 F.3d 276 (2d Cir.
2005), which addressed the applicability of equitable tolling to § 405(g)'s statute of
limitations and defined the claimant's burden as follows: "'[T]he doctrine of equitable
tolling permits courts to deem filings timely where a litigant can show that he has been
pursuing his rights diligently and that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his
way.'" Jackson, 506 F.3d at 1353 (brackets in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Torres, 417 F.3d at 279)).
248. Jackson, 506 F.3d at 1354-55; see Cabello v. Fernndez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148,
1154 (1 1th Cir. 2005) (requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate that extraordinary circumstances
prevented them from filing their claims within the ten-year statute of limitations under the
Alien Tort Claims Act and the Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000)); In
re Intl Admin. Servs., Inc., 408 F.3d 689, 700 (11th Cir. 2005) (applying an extraordinary
circumstances standard to tolling the statute of limitations under 11 U.S.C. § 546(a)(1)
(2000)); Ross v. Buckeye Cellulose Corp., 980 F.2d 648, 660 (11th Cir. 1993) (requiring
claimants suing under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to
2000e-17 (2000), to justify equitable tolling of that statute's limitations period by a showing
of extraordinary circumstances); Sandvik v. United States, 177 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th Cir.
1999) (applying the extraordinary circumstances standard to claims brought under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) (amended 2008)).
249. Id. at 1355 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.1411 (2007)). This regulation provides as
follows:
"In determining whether you have shown that you have good cause for missing a
deadline to request review we consider-(1) What circumstances kept you from
making the request on time; (2) Whether our action misled you; (3) Whether you
did not understand the requirements of the Act resulting from amendments to the
Act, other legislation, or court decisions; and (4) Whether you had any physical,
mental, educational, or linguistic limitations (including any lack of facility with
the English language) which prevented you from filing a timely request or from
understanding or knowing about the need to file a timely request for review."
Id. at 1355 n.3 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416.1411(a)).
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deadline for filing a complaint in federal district court. 250 Next,
Jackson contended that her limited linguistic and legal experience made
it impossible for her to understand that she was required to file her
claims in district court.2 5' Unpersuaded, the court held that the
Appeals Council plainly instructed Jackson that she could file a civil
action by filing a complaint in district court. 2 Moreover, the court
noted that ignorance of the law did not satisfy the narrow and stringent
"extraordinary circumstances" standard.253
Third, Jackson argued that the state clerk misled her by processing
her case without objection, giving her the impression that she had filed
her claim in a court of competent jurisdiction.2 4 Disagreeing, the
court noted it had previously held that "'to apply equitable tolling, courts
usually require some affirmative misconduct, such as deliberate
concealment.'"255 Nothing in the record suggested the clerk or the
Commissioner deliberately misled Jackson.256

250. Id. at 1355 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.1482 (2007)). Section 416.1482 provides in
relevant part:
"Any party to the Appeals Council's decision or denial of review, or to an
expedited appeals process agreement, may request that the time for filing an
action in a Federal district court be extended .... The request must be filed with
the Appeals Council, or if it concerns an expedited appeals process agreement,
with one of our offices. If you show that you had good cause for missing the
deadline, the time period will be extended. To determine whether good cause
exists, we use the standards explained in § 416.1411."
Id. at 1355 n.4 (alteration in original) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416.1482).
251. Id. at 1356.
252. Id. The court further noted that "the Appeals Council used words such as 'United
States District Court,' 'U.S. Attorney,' 'Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,' and 'Attorney
General of the United States, Washington, D.C.,' making it clearer still," in the Eleventh
Circuit's opinion, that a civil action had to be filed in a federal court. Id.
253. Id. (citing Wakefield v. R.R. Ret. Rd., 131 F.3d 967,970 (11th Cir. 1997); Sandvik,
177 F.3d at 1272; Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990)).
254. Id.
255. Id. (quoting Cabello, 402 F.3d at 1155).
256. Id. The court clarified this point by noting that when no evidence of deliberate
concealment exists, but the claimant nevertheless has been misinformed by a court's
misleading actions or instructions, the court would equitably toll the relevant statute of
limitations. Id. at 1356-57. The court cited as examples its decisions in Spottsville v.
Terry, 476 F.3d 1241, 1245-46 (11th Cir. 2007), Goldsmith v. City of Atmore, 996 F.2d 1155,
1161 (11th Cir. 1993), and Washington v. Ball, 890 F.2d 413, 415 (11th Cir. 1989) (per
curiam), but noted that unlike the claimants in those cases, Jackson had not timely filed
her challenge or a motion for an extension in the appropriate court. Jackson, 506 F.3d at
1356-57. In addition, she had not been misled by the clerk, and the clerk had not
otherwise caused her filing error. Id.
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Finally, Jackson argued that the district court improperly applied
Burnett to the facts of her case." 7 In Burnett the United States
Supreme Court held, in the FELA context, that "'when a plaintiff begins
a timely FELA action in a state court having jurisdiction,. . . the FELA
limitation is tolled during the pendency of the state suit.'"25 ' The
Eleventh Circuit interpreted Burnett as holding that a statute of
limitations can be tolled only by a plaintiff who timely files in a state
court "'with competent jurisdiction over his claim.'"259 The state court
in which Jackson filed suit was not a court with competent jurisdiction
over Jackson's claim.26° The court noted that it had numerous opportunities in the past to consider the applicability of equitable tolling to
statutes other than FELA, and in each case it had determined that
"'filing in a court without competent jurisdiction did not toll the statute
of limitations."'2 61 Thus, while allowing equitable tolling of the sixtyday statute of limitations under § 405(g) in the proper circumstances,
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Jackson's
complaint, holding that Jackson's failure to demonstrate extraordinary
circumstances, such as fraud, misinformation, or deliberate concealment,
prevented her from timely filing her § 405(g) case in the district
court.262

VII.

CONCLUSION

The 2007 survey period yielded several noteworthy decisions, many of
which involved issues of first impression in the Eleventh Circuit. While
this Survey is not intended to be exhaustive, the Authors have attempted to provide material that will be useful to practitioners by providing

257.
258.
259.

Jackson, 506 F.3d at 1357.
Id. (quoting Burnett, 380 U.S. at 434-35).
Id. (quoting Hairston v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co., 232 F.3d 1348, 1352 (11th Cir.

2000)).
260. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). In Jackson's case, it was undisputed that § 405(g)
made federal courts the exclusive forum in which claimants may challenge final decisions
of the Commissioner. Id.
261. Id. at 1357-58 (quoting Hairston, 232 F.3d at 1353 (holding that filing a claim
under the National Flood Insurance Program, 42 U.S.C. § 4072 (2000), in a state court that
lacked competent jurisdiction did not toll the statute of limitations)); Bailey v. Carnival
Cruise Lines, Inc., 774 F.2d 1577, 1579-81 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that filing a claim
under the Death on High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-769(c) (repealed 1986), in a state court
lacking competent jurisdiction did not toll the statute of limitations); United States ex rel.
Harvey Gulf Int'l Marine, Inc. v. Md. Cas. Co., 573 F.2d 245, 247 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding
that filing a claim under the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. § 270(b) (2000), in a state court without
competent jurisdiction did not toll the statute of limitations).
262. Jackson, 506 F.3d at 1358.
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relevant updates in the area of federal trial practice and procedure in
the Eleventh Circuit.

